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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OPAL WHI'TLOGK,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
OLD AMER.ICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Def enda.nt and Appellant.

Case No.
11019

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FAOTS
Respondent feels appellant's statement of the facts
is somewhat argumentative and inadequate and submits
th1c• following as an aid to understanding the case at hand.
On April 3, 1961, Arthur -Whitlock obtained a policy
of insurance, limited to accidental death, from Old
American Insurance Company.
In May of 1962 Arthur Whitlock was operated on

l'or cancer in Salt Lake City, Utah, had one lung removed,
nnd returned to his residence in Enterprise, Utah, where

2
he carried on a relatively normal life until he was severe!>'
injured in an automobile accident on the 24th day of
September 1962.

After his operation Arthur Whitlock was in good ,
spirits. He was not despondent or unhappy. He loved
to talk. He was up and about all the time; he watched
television, read quite a bit and even worked in the yard.
(Tr. 10, 11, 22, 24, 96, 97, 104, 105, 121)
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On September 24, 1962, while enroute from Enterprise, Utah to Cedar City, Utah, Mr. Whitlock suffered
severe injuries in a one car automobile accident in whieh
a 17 year old fellow passenger was killed. (Tr. 116, 11'7)
The evidence shows that Mr. Whitlock received a severe
blow to the head causing a brain concussion. There immediately developed a large blood clot, swelling, and
discoloration above his right ear, and the right side of
his face and neck was discolored. (Tr. 15, 64, 98, 106,
107, 119)
After the accident there was a marked change in
Mr. Whitlock's attitude and activities. His movement
was severely restricted and he never got out of bed. He
wouldn't talk or eat much ,and he refused to read. He
did not act natural nor was he interested in his surroundings. He was not responsive to loved ones who
visited him at the hospital. He complained constantly
of pain in his he:ad and eye. He would hold his head
in his hands and complain of pain. (Tr. 14, 15, 16, 18, 20,
21, 22, 24, 100, 106, 107' 108, 109, 123)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DECEnENT'S
WIDOW AND AGAINST THE INSUR~
ANiCE COMPANY.
This case was tried to a jury which brought in a
unanimous verdict in favor of the decedent's widow and
against the insurance company. This was not error.
'L1here was sufficient competent evidence to support the
jury's conclusion that Arthur Whitlock died from in.juries received shortly before in an automobile accident.
The uncontroverted evidence showed that decedent entered the Iron County Hospital on the 24th of September,
1962, immediately following a serious automobile accident
in which one fell ow passenger was fatally injured. The
uncontroverted evidence further shows that Mr. Whi~
lock suffered very severe injuries about the head. He
was examined at the time of admission to the hospital
by Dr. Graff, who testified concerning decedent's condition on admission as follows: (Tr. 64)
And what was his appearance when you saw
him1
A. (by Dr. Graff) When he came to the hospital 1
Q. Yes.
A. Well, he was pretty well in shock and had a
bruise and hematoma above the right ear.
Q. What do you mean by hematoma ~
A. Oh, big blood clot, swelling, discoloration.
Q.
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Dr. Graff stated that decedent's symptoms could
indicate that the head injury was the direct and irnmediatP causP of Arthur \Vhitlock's death. (Tr. 66) Plaintiff's exhibit Number 8 is a claim form submitted to the
( Hd American Insurance Company. On this form, signed
hy Dr. Graff as tlw attending physician, the primary
eause of death is listt>d in Paragraph 13 as "Brain Concussion." Dr. Graff was asked whethPr Paragraph 13
was inconsistent with his (Graff's) <-'XperiPnce, diagnosi~
and trPatment of Arthur \Yhitlock. Dr. Graff testified
that it was not. (Tr. G6, 78)
Decedent's wife, testified that after the cancer operation, but before his accident, decedent was normally conversant; that he was not despondent or unhappy; that
he watched television and read quite a bit; that he wa8
up and about and also worked at times about the house.
(Tr. 10, 11) This

h•stirnon~-

was substantiated by Gloria

Cox step daughter of decedent. (Tr. 103, 10-1-, 105, 106)
.Ada Spears' testimon~- was similar (Tr. 95, 9(i, 97) Sidney
Boyce vVhitlock testified that the decedent read a lot;
that he worked outside hot>ing weeds and irrigating; and
that just prior to the accident while enroute to Cedar
City, Utah the decedent was laughing and joking. (Tr.
119, 121, 122)
The evidenc<:> shows hmY<:>ver that immediately following the accident, d<:>cedents attitude and activity suffered a marked and demostrahle change.
Decedent':-; wifr testified that following the accident
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the dt'cedent didn't act natural; that his movement was
:-;pverly restricted and he didn't get out of bed; that he
wouldn't talk or read and didn't seem to be interested
in anything; that he didn't know his small son and
didn't seem to care. (Tr. 1-±, 15, lG, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 2-±)
'L'estirnony of Gloria Cox supplements and substantiates
the above testimony of Mrs. Whitlock. (Tr. 106, 107, 108)
Ava Spears gave similar testimony. (Tr. 98, 99, 100)
Decedent's wife further testified that after the acci<lent decedent complained strongly and continually of
pain in his head and eye. (Tr. 23)
Ada Spears testified that before the accident decedPnt did not complain much, (Tr. 96), but after the accident he would put his hands to his head and say that his
head hurt. (Tr. 100)
Sidney Boyce Whitlock testified that after the accident decedent kept grabbing his head like he was in pain.
('L'r. 121)
Gloria Cox testified concerning decedent's pain, beginning on Page 109, Line 6 of the transcript of the
tPstirnony as follows:
He would just hold his whole head. He would
just get his hands up there and just press his
hands on his head and I could see his hands shake
and would; and I asked him on numerous occasions if he was in pain and he said that he was.
The foregoing testimony indicates a direct, substantial moribund change in decedent caused by the head
injury and not cancer. The jury could and did conclude
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that the direct and immediate cause of death was injury
suffered in the automobile accident.
\Vhether Mr. Whitlock died as a direct result of the
accident was properly a question for the jury. Lee v.
Neu,, York Life Ins. Co., 95 Utah -1--1-5, 82 P.2d 178 (1938).
Accord, Griffin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 10~
Utah 563, 133 P.2d 333 (1943); Hassing v. Mutiwl Life,
108 Utah 198, 159 P.2d 117 (1945).
In White v. National Postal Transport Ass'n., 1 Utah
2d 5, 261 P.2d 924 (1953), in which this court affirmed
a verdict for the beneficiary on far less compelling facts,
there was testimony that insured had "advanced heart
disease." The certificate of insurance provided for the
payment of $4,000 if death resulted solely from accidental injuries. The insured was struck on the calf of
his right leg. The leg had to be amputated and tests of
the leg revealed Buerger's disease. Some: months later
the insured died, apparently from blood clots to the brain
or other vital organs. The insurance company refused to
pay on the grounds that the accidental bump on the leg
sustained by the insured was not directly, independently
and exclusively the cause of death, but that the heart
disease and Buerger's disease were, at least, contributing
causes. The jury found for the plaintiff. The Uta11
Supreme .Court affirmed the jury verdict concluding:
"Viewing the evidence as a whole and in a light
most favorable to the respondent we find no error
in submitting the case to thP jury."
The Court said the jury could find either that the acci-
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dt>ntal blow to the leg reactiviated decedent's heart disease or started an unbroken chain of events which led to
the death, independently of any contributing cause .
.Just as in White, supra, there is ample, competent
<•vidence in the instant case from which the jury could,
and did, find decedent's death to be covered by the
insurance policy.
There is substantial evidence to support the jury
verdict and it is well established in this jurisdiction that
the trial courts findings not against the preponderance of
thr evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. Osborne v.
Pfters, 69 Utah 391, 255 P. 435 (1927). Glenn v. Rich,
106 Utah 232, 147 P.2d 849 (1944).
POINT IL THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE .JURY AND IN
ANY EVENT IN THE ABSENCE OF A
A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF rrHE
INSTRUCTIONS AS GIVEN, IT MUST
BE PR.ESUMED THAT THEY WERE
COR.REiCT.
The transcript before this court does not contain the
Pntire instructions given by the trial judge. Only selected
portions of the instructions are quoted in the appellant's
brief. However, when read together and not in fragments
ewn these portions of the instructions show th'at the
rorrect standard was applied by the trial court.
Utah law clearly does not permit the insurer a windfall simply because the insured's physical condition was
less than perfect. See White v. Nationa.Z Postal Transport Ass'n., 1 Utah 2d 5, 261 P.2d 924 (1953).
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EYen those portions of Instruction 4 quoted in Ap1wllant's brief (page 8) sho'v that the language there assertedly used, adequately and properly instructed the jury.
ln addition to the language complained of by appellant
the instruction speaks of the requirement of death as a
direct result of injuries received in the accident. Read
as a whole, even without the benefit of the entire instructons, it must be concluded that the court properly instructed the jury.
There is substantial precedent in Utah for the proposition that an insurance company may still be liable,
although a preexisting disease is present where the aceident is regarded as the proximate or primary cause of
the harm. In Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y.
of th<' United States, 94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1060 (1937),
re. hear. 94 Utah 570, 80 P.2d 348 (1938), the insured
was an oral surgeon who received injuries to his index
finger from a fall. The insured subsequently developed
arthritis in his index finger which caused him to be
disabled. Then' was evidence that insured had toxemia
in his body prior to the accident, which caused the development of arthritis. The court stated:
"There being some snpporting evidence, the
finding of the trial judge will not be disturbed.
~Vv e must therefore hold that where disability resnlts, even though aggravated or intensified by
a disease which follows as a natural, though not
necessary, consequence of an accidental physical
injury, or "-here the> disease is induced or set in
motion as a result of tlw injury, disability or
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death is deemed the proximate result of the injury
and not of the disease as an independent rause."
Wnrthem10re, in Handley v. Mutual Life I11s. Co., 106
Utah 184, 147 P.2d 319 (1944), the Court interpreted an
iHsmance polic~· ,,·hich prov1Cled for indemnit~· if the
insured died "as a direct result of bodily injury affected
so1Ply through external, violent, and accidental means
inde1wndently and exclusively of all other causes." The
r·omt found that it was unnecessary that the accident
liP the sole cause of death, but was sufficient if the accident was the dominant cause.
Decisions from other jurisdictions lend weight to the
argument that the accident may be the dominant or proximate cause of death and the insurance company will still
bP liable.

In Brooks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 2d
305, 163 P.2d 689 (1945), the California Supreme Court
said that the correct rule is that the presence of a pre(•xisting disease or infirmity will not relieve the insurer
from liability if the accident is the proximate cause of the
d(,ath. Accord, Scanlan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
93 F.2d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 1937), Hughes v. Provident
Jfotual Life Ins., 258 S.W. 2d 290 (Mo. App. 1953).
Respondent contends that there was substantial evidence from which the jury could find that the automobile
accident, in the language of White v. National Postal
Transport Ass'n., supra, "started an unbroken chain of
\'ircnrnstances which led to [decedent's] death independPntly of any contributing cause."
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The general rule is nffiewing the propriety and
correctness of instructions is that an appellate court
should consider the charge as a whole. Cope v. Davidso11
30 Cal. 2d 193, 180 P.2d 873 (1947). The instructiom
should be read together and not piecemeal. Phoenix v.
Harlen, 75 Ariz. 290, 255 P.2d 609 (1953).
-
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The entire charge given by the trial court in the
instant case is neither in the record nor the transcript.
It is apP'ellant's duty to include in the record those instructions given, and thosC' refused. Robbs v. Central
Sitr. & Ins. Corp., 188 Kan. 506, 363 P.2d 427 (1961).
Where the entire charge given by the trial court is not in
the record, the appellate court cannot prt>sume that the '
instructions given were erroneous. Inland Power & Light
Co. v. Grieger, 91 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1937); Revlon Inc.
-z;. Buchanan, 271 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1959). In Buchanan
1·. Crites, 106 Utah 128, 150 P.2d 100 (1944), the Court
states:
"If the record on appr>al is not sufficient to determine a material question because appellant has
failed to bring enough of the record before tlw
appellate court, doubt should be resolved in favor

of sustaining trial courts judgment."

·while appellant complains of th<:' instructions given
by the trial court, it did not suhmit instructions purporting to state correctly the law in the subject area. Merely
complaining of the instructions given is insufficient in
the absence of better instructions.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, the plaintiff respectfully prays this Court to dismiss the appeal and to affirm
thr judgment rendered on the jury verdict below.
Respectfully submitted,

J. HARLAN BURNS
95 North Main Street
Cedar City, Utah
Attorney for the
Plaintiff-Respondent

